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In our lull Con~ellLaw Review article,
we summarize and analyze the principal
findiilgs of psychological research
concerning children's suggeslibility as well
as other lactors that may affect the
creclibiliiy of a child's allegation ol abuse.
We demonstrate ihal what Lyon
characterizes as a "new wave" of research is
actually a broad and long-slanding
scientific mainstream. We argue that he
resul~sof this research do, indeed, raise
significant concerns lor he real world of
abuse and abuse invesiigation and ~ h u s
engender signilicant legal implications.
Par1 I of the lull article briefly describes
[he history and current slate of research
mto children's suggestibili~~
In this part,
we argue thal, although psychological
researchers disagree considerably over the
degree to which he suggestibility of young
children may lead to false allega~ionsof
sexual abuse, there is an overwhelming
consensus that children are suggestible to a
degree that, we believe, must be regarded
as significant. In presenting this argument,
we respond to the contentions of
revisionist scholars, particularly those
recently expressed by Professor Lyon. We
s1lo.c~that there is good reason to believe
the use of highly suggestive questions
remains very common, and h a t these
questions present a significant possibility
that children will make false allegations
even 011 matters such as sexual abuse.
Part I1 develops a framework, using
Bayesian probability theory, for considering
the findings described in Part I. We argue
that there is meril to the traditional - and
u ~ an
constitutionally compelled - ~ i e that
inaccurate criminal conviction is a far
worse result than a failure to reach an
accurate conviction, and that this
perspective should inform the design of
legal sys~ems.With this in mind, we
explain thal even relatively slight
probabililies of false allegations are
polentially significanl. Moreover, we show
thal the very substanlial probability that a
child who has been abused will fail to
reveal the abuse tends, perhaps counterinluitively, to diminish the probative value
ol an allegation of abuse when it is
aclually made.
I11 he discussion belom7, taken from Par1
111 of the longer article, we turn 10 discussion
ol the legal implications of our analysis.

SuggesLive interview
techniques
Scientific research demonstrates that
suggestive questions, including techniques
such as coaching, bribes, and threats,
increase the probability that the child will
make an allegation of abuse regardless of
whether it actually occurred. If in the end
the child would make an allegation, hen
for two reasons it is preferable that this
occur without suggesti~7equeslioning. First,
an unprompted allegation is more
powerful, persuasive evidence than a
prompted allegation and therefore more
likely to lead to a conviction if the
defendant is in fact guilty For this reason,
the self-interesc of the investigative and
prosecutorial authorities should lead them
to avoid suggestive questions when
possible. Second, ii the child does make an
unprompted allegation, it is unlikely to
result in an inaccurate conviction, because
in most circumstances children are very
unlikely to make a false allegation without
suggestive questionmg.
It is preferable, therefore, to avoid
suggestive questioning until the child has
told all that she is likely to tell aithout
suggestion. But for at least two reasons we
do not believe that investigators should
avoid suggestive questioning altogether.
First, the information that they gain
through sugestive questioning may be
useful for purposes other than criminal
prosecution - for example, the
determination of custodj~arrangements or
the appropriateness of a restraining order.
Because the governing standard of
persuasion is lower in these settings than in
criminal prosecutions, information
obtained by suggestion is more likely to be
decisive than in a ciiminal setting. Second,
even in criminal prosecutions, an allegation
procured by suggestive questioning ma):
depending particularly on the stl-ength of
the rest of the case, be decisive in carrying
the prosecution's burden of persuasion.
We recommend, therefore, that
investigalors avoid suggestive queslions
until they are confident that the child has
told all she is likely to tell without
pronlpting. Inteniewers should attempt to
limit repetition of closed (i.e. yeslno)
questions ~wtlzinthe intenielv, and
investigative authorities should, to [he
exlent feasible, avoid nlultiple interviews
\\ill1 mul~ipleinteniebvers. Furthernlore,
inleniewers should adopt categorical rules
against the use of techniques that have

been demonstrated to create particularly
significant risks that a child will make a
false allegation. Thus, interviewers should
not offer rewards or other positive
reinforcement for favored answers, lhreaten
punishment or create negative
reinforcement for disfavored ones, vilify the
accused, or (unless the child has raised the
matter first) refer to statements by the
child's peers. Though suggestive questions
are sometimes useful, the use of these
techniques is always improper.
There is nothing particularly novel
about these recommendations. Although
some interviewers may ignore them in
practice, they are essentially textbook
principles, much elabora~edin manuals for
inteniewers - including one by the
National Center for the Prosecution of
Child Abuse, in cooperation with llze
National District Attorney's Association and
the American Prosecutor's Research
Institute. Interestingly, for all [hat Lyon and
other child advocates contend that
suggestive questioning is often necessary to
prompt an accurate statement and that
(nevertheless) troublesome questioning
does not often occur in real practice, they
do not argue anything differen~.They do
not, for example, argue that investigators
should feel free to ask suggestive questions
without restraint.

Witness taint and
co~npetence
In State 11. Micizaels (612 A.2d 1372,
1378 [N.J. 1994]), the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that if the defendant
presents "'some evidence' that the [child's]
statements were the product of suggestive
or coercive inteniew techniques," then the
pi-osecution must demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence at a pretrial "taint
hearing" that, "considering the ~otalityof
the circumstances surrounding the
interviews, the statements or testimony [of
the child] retain a degree of reliability
sufficient to outweigh [he effects of the
improper i n t e ~ ~ i etechniques."
~v
If the
proseculion lails to satisfy this burden,
then the courl must esclude the child3
testimon)! as well as her plior statements
alleging abuse.
Some courts outside New Jersey have
occasionally folloa7ed A/liil~aelsin requiring

taint hearings. but more commonly courts
simply consider these issues in determining
the competency of the child to give
testimony For our purposes, the difference
is not particularly significant. Either way
the bottom-line issue is whether the court
should preclude the child from giving live
testimony about the abuse because she has
been subjected to a substantial degree of
sugestion.
Although Ceci coauthored the a~nicus
brief that some have credited with
persuading the hdichacls court, we agree in
general with Lynn and John E.B. Myers that
children's suggestibility should not usually
prevent them from being heard as
witnesses, even if the circumstances
indicate that the child was subjected to
strong forms of suggestion. We have two
basic reasons for reaching this conclusion.
First, a child's statement alleging abuse
has significant value in prosing that abuse.
Nothing we have said indicates the
contrary Our arpment supports the
proposition that the suggestibility of the
child ma! account for her allegation of
abuse in some circumstances. The
allegation itself is thus not conclusive
evidence that abuse occurred. But the
allegation may yet be important, even
decisive elidence, at least when there is
other evidence supporting it. In our longer
article, we have argued that in some
settings there is a greater than minuscule
probability that the child would make the
allegation even though it was false, and
therefore the statement is not conclusive
evidence, or nearly conclusive evidence,
that the abuse occurred as described by the
child. But we hare not argued that the
statement should not alter a reasonable
fact-finder's assessment of the probability of
guilt. Plainly, it is often very significant
evidence, even in the face of significant
suggestion.
Second, we believe that the dignity of
the child is fostered by allowing her to tell
her story first-hand in the proceeding that
will resolve the truth of her allegation.
Against these considerations, three basic
arguments may be made for escluding the
testimony of the child. We \\ill call these
the reliability argument, the best e~ldence
argument, and the ~vrongfulconduct
arLgument .

1. According to the lrliabilitv argrmcnt,
on ~vhichMicllacls principally depended, if
the child has been subjected to significant
suggestion, her testimony may be so
unreliable that it should be rejected. We
certainly agree that often the child's
testimony may not be reliable in the sense
of being virtually conclusive. Indeed, in
some circumstances, the testimony may
not even be reliable in the weaker sense
that the denominator of the likelihood ratio
- the probability that the child would
testifj as she has even though the
testimony is false - is very small. But
notwithstanding some judicial statements
to the contrary, reliability in neither sense
is, or should be, the general standard for
the admissibility of live testimony Rather,
the governing principle is that, at least
within broad bounds, the credibility of
witnesses is for the jury to determine.
In an earlier age, courts escluded the
testimony of many potential witnesses,
including the parties themselves, on the
ground that bias or some other factor
would make their testimony unreliable.
The modem, vastly preferable view
recognizes that such an exclusionary
approach has huge costs in loss of valuable
information. Cross-examination,
impeachment, rebuttal, and re~o~gnition
by
the fact-finder of defects of the testimony
- sometimes with the assistance of expert
testimony - are the mechanisms that we
hope will prevent the testimony from
leading the fact-finder astray. Testimony of
the parties is extremely unreliable, if for no
reason other than self-interest, but it is
universally allowed today. Indeed, a
criminal defendant has a constitutional
right to present his own testimony, even, in
at least some circumstances, if it has been
tainted by suggestion. In general, witnesses
who claim firsthand knowledge do not
have to pass through a reliability screen,
e\ren when testifying against a criminal
defendant. Witnesses with a grudge against
the defendant, witnesses whose perception
of the events at issue may have been
impeded by stress, bad lighting, or weak
eyesight, witnesses with faulty memory,
and witnesses who have been offered some
inducement (such as a reduction of
sentence) to testify - all these are allowed
to testify about what they assert they
perceived, without the court first
determining that their evidence is reliable.
Courts should not ho1.d the testimony of
children to a more stringent standard.
A reliability standard for the admissibility
of testimony misconceives the basic theory
of evidence. To warrant admissibility, an

individual item of evidence does not have
to point reliably in the direction the
proponent claims. "A brick is not a wall,"
and every witness need not hit a home n l n ,
in the classic aphorisms. That is, a single
piece of evidence including the testimony
of a witness, does not have to support the
prosecution's entire case but need only
provide one of the building blocks for the
case. Prosecution evidence, not reliable in
itself because there is a substantial
probability that it would arise even if the
defendant were innocent, may in
conjunction with other evidence make an
overwhelming case.
The better standard is whether the
prejudicial potential of the evidence
outweighs the probative value. It must be
constantly borne in mind that the child's
testimony that abuse occurred does have
substantial probative value. Even if the
child was subjected to strong forms of
suggestion, the child is significantly more
likely to testify to a gven proposition if
that proposition is true than if it is false,
and no research suggests otherwise. In
some cases, that probative value may be
decisive.
What then of prejudice? The principal
prejudice concern is that the jury will
overvalue the testimony by so much that
the truth-determination process is
benefited by exclusion. But to our
knowledge, the scientific research provides
no indication that juries are likely to
overvalue the testimony of a child to this
degree. It may well be that, especially
absent explanation of the research on
suggestibility, a jury would tend to
underestimate the probability that the child
would make the allegation if it was false
(the denominator of the likelihood ratio).
Such an error would tend to cause the jury
to over-assess the probative value of the
testimony. It is much more doubtful,
however, that the jury would over-assess
the probative value to such an extent that
admission of the evidence is worse for the
truth-determining process than denylng the
jury access to this information. After all,
jurors are capable of understanding the
problem of suggestibility and taking it into
account in assessing the testimony, and
experimental evidence suggests that they
do. Excluding the evidence, which has
some probative value, guarantees that the
jury will under-assess it. Those who argue
for this result, notwithstanding the usual
rule that credibility is for the jury, should
have the burden of demonstrating that the
uncertain prospect of jury over-assessment
is significant enough to warrant exclusion.
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criminsl
Thus, jurisdictions taw a
the childk testimony have s u b s ~ t i a l
receptive attitude tcqm& hearsay ,
weight only in extreme ad,a 4 wen
statements by children aUcghg abuse
,
then only the best eviden? and wrongful
against hem have done so on the grpwnds
condudt arguments carry significanr&rce.
that the stdlt~mentsam wliahk. Indx
The reliability argument, the one
of a statement made by s very yowlrg Mdi
principally emphasized by Michaels, is
, two f a n ~have
s baespaddarly
unpersuasive. Thus,in extreme a e s ,
influential - &rst,thc apparent absence 06
when the inte~ewmgtechnique violates
a motive far the cMd to lie and, cond,
clearly established norms or amounts to an the apparent unlikelihood in sape s e d g s
intentional or reckless usurpation of the
that the child could develop a plan KO
childk memory -and Mirhaek appears to
dedeive or tc~cm&et her account if it (+d
have been such a case -exclusion is
not in fact reflect abuse she had m c d y
justifiable. In other cases, it is not.
sukred,
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The scientific r-h,
however,
indicates.that in some cimmstmces
,
childrenb s t a t t $ i k a= not parriculasly
reliable. C o m p d to gkner~1hearsay, a
Often the child makes an allegaticm
statement made by a child who has been
before trial, but does not ~estlfyat all at
subjected to strong hrms-dsuggestion
trial or does not testify to rhe full substance may be notably unrebble, The apparent
of the earlier allegation. If the prosecutor
ab-ce of a motive to lie Ss d significance
offers the prior statement into evidence the
only to the extent the defendant, in
defendant will likely object that it is barred
attempting to reconcile the fact that the
by the rule against hearsay and by his right , child made the statement with his theory
under the Sixth Amendment to the
that the statemgnt is false, contends bat
Constitution to "be confronted with @e
the child lied. The defendant may,
witnesses against him."
however, contend principally not that the
In recent years, most jurisdictions have
chld lied huct that suggestive questianing
relaxed the application of the hearsay rule
led her to believe honmtly h t Ehe
so far as it would exclude out-of-court
assertion was tmihhtl. Also, sugge~tive
statements by children that allege abuse
questioning may make it far mme plausible
and are offered to prove the abuse. Some
that the child would state a &e account of
courts have accomplished thisend by
abuse that one would m t a t h e m e m p ~ t
stretching the limitations on the hearsay
from a young child who was not abused.
exceptions for excited utterances and for
Far obvious ethical reasons, resea-s
statements made for medical diagnmis or
have letrained from trying to hmlcam false
.
treatment. Others have invoked the
memories of abuse; however, there is
residual ortUcat.ch-alln
exception to the
ample anecdatal evidence that field
hearsay rule now expressed in Federal Rule inte~ewerssometimes ply child yvitnmes
with infamution that could lbe e o m ~ ~ ~
of Evidence 807. Also, some states have
as indicative of s a d abuse. Same of thi~
adopted hearsay exceptions specifically
hfomtion, if later incorpomted into the
tailored for children of "tender years."
childk & c l 0 6 ~ ~would
,
be &dmd
Because the Supreme Court has,LO a hrge
outside her OT:&T~ redm df kowlec@~
extent, conformed the confrontaition right
and so viewed by f ~ t - h d e r as
s a stlrmgl.
to the prevailing law of hearsay, tbk
indicatjon that abuse ocmmd. '
Confrontation Clause as now cmmmed
poses only a slight a d d z t i d barrier to
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We emphasize two points. First, we are
not arguing that all children's statements
;Ire unreliable. How reliable a statement is
depends on all the circumstances,
including - as we have suggested above
and throughout our longer article - the
nature of the interviewing process to which
the child has been subjected. For example,
sometimes a child, without any prompting,
articulates a detailed and plausible account
of abuse soon after the alleged event and,
still without prompting, consistently
~tdheresto that account. In such a
situation, the child's statement may be
very reliable.
Second, even if the statement appears
unreliable, that does not necessarily mean
that a court should exclude it under an
ideal doctrine of hearsay and confrontation.
Friedman has argued for some years that
the law of hearsay and confrontation is in a
most unsatisfactory state. The chief errors,
in his view. lie in conforming the
confrontation right to the law of hearsay
and in perceiving both as based principally
the reliability of
on the need to impro~~e
evidence. This conjunction results both in
hearsay law that is often overly restrictive
and in a confrontation right that is
insufficiently protective of defendants. We
do not attempt to develop this argument in
full here. But a system that, according to
Friedman, would be far superior to the
present one could admit many hearsay
statements by children without making the
admissibility decision depend on a
determination of reliability.

Expert] evidence
Traditionally, courts have been loath to
allow expert witnesses to testify about
factors affecting the credibility of percipient
witnesses. Courts were afraid that ehFerts
would usurp one of the central functions of
the jury, to evaluate the credibility of
uqtnesses. In recent decades, ho~vever,
courts have been more willing to allow
experts to testify about factors that might
affect rhe credibility of a witness in a gven
s~tuationand that might othentise be
insufficiently understood by a jury In
criminal cases, either the prosecution or
the defense may urge the need for espert
testimony. For example, a defendant may
Introduce expert testimony on the
\ulnerabilities of eyewitness testimony A
prosecutor might introduce espert
'estimony concerning rape trauma
yndrotne to help explain the complainant's

delay in making her allegation of rape.
Similarly, in child sexual abuse cases,
prosecutors often offer, and courts often
admit, expert evidence to bolster the
complainant's credibility. As Myers has
stated, "Courts permit expert testimony
[among other reasons] to explain why
sexually abused children delay reporting
abuse, why children recant, why children's
descriptions of abuse are sometimes
inconsistent, why some abused children are
angry, why some children want to live with
the person who abused them, why a victim
might appear 'emotionally flat' following
the assault, [and] why a child might run
away from home. . . ."
Myers endorses the use of such
testimony, which often fits within the
rubric of child abuse accommodation
syndrome, on the ground that "[tlo the
untutored eye of a juror, such behavior
may seem incompatible with allegations of
sexual abuse." U1e agree that such
testimony on behalf of the prosecution is
proper at least after the defendant attacks
the child's credibility - and sometimes
even before, if the grounds on which the
j u n might doubt her credibility are
already apparent.
Often, ho\irever, it is the defense in child
sesual abuse cases that nishes to introduce
credibility-related esTert testimony usually
to show that the child's statements may
questioning.
have resulted from suggesti~~e
Many courts have admitted such testimony
but some courts still esclude it or confine it
rather narron7l>: Lyon, while not expressing
any opinion on the frequent use by
prosecutors of expert testimony to bolster a
child's credibility once it has been attacked,
espresses doubt about the need for defense
espert testimony on suggestibility.
We believe that if evidence supports the
conclusion that an inteniewer subjected
the child to a given set of suggestive
influences, then the court should allonr the
defense to present the testimony of a \veilqualified esFert as to the plausible effects
of those influences.
The research on suggestibility discussed
in this article gii\.es an expert ample basis
on which to esyress an opinion that should
easily satisfy the "gatekeeping" scrutiny of
the trial court as outlined by Dnu27ct-t I!
Afc17-c11DOMI
? ) h ( 7 1 7 7 1 ~ ~ ~117~.
l l t i ~(509
d ~ U.S.
579, 597 [1993]).Indeed, if the "general
acceptance" test of
I! Lhlitcd Stntcs
(293 E 1013, 1014 [D.C. Cir. 1923]),
which still prevails in some states, is
sensibly applied, such espert opinion
should easily satisb that test as well. As
Part I of our F-111 article shows. this research

has used the scientific method of testing,
has been extensi\rely subjected to the rigors
of publication and review, and has gained
broad acceptance in the scientific
community. Naturally as in any area of the
social sciences (and some of the hard
sciences as well), there is not unanimity on
all significant points, and on some points
there is a range of interpretations. But a
court should not exclude testimony by a
qualified e,\pert reflecting an opinion held
by a clear majority, or even by substantial
proportion, of professionals in the field
simply because others hold divergent
~ i e w sIf. that were the standard for
exclusion, fact-finders \vould virtually
never have the benefit of the experts'
knowledge. Thus, we find unpersuasive the
rather mysterious opinion of the Eighth
Circuit in Unitcd States I: Rotlsc (1 11 E3d
561 [sth Cir. 19971). which held that the
trial court had acted within its discretion in
allowing the defense expert to testify on the
basis of his own research, but not on the
basis of the research of others.
The question remains whether, and
when, an expert's opinion may assist the
jury sufficiently to warrant admissibility
Ultimately, this question depends on an
assessment of the probative value and
prejudice of the espert evidence. Lyon
contends that ':jurors likely already knon-"
that "children are suggestible." This
argument may seem odd, coming near the
end of a long article contending that
children are not as sugqestible as some
interpretations of the research indicate. But
Lyons point seems to be that, while
children are indeed suggestible to some
degree, jurors do not need e\Fert advice to
tell them that, and such ad\ice may in fact
cause jurors to overestimate substantially
the degree of suggestibility. Myers makes a
similar point. saying that "some adults"
think children are more suggestible than
they actually are.
One can easily accept the proposition
- ~vhichLyon supports with survey
evidence - that many even most,
potential jurors understand that children
are inore suggestible than adults, and yet
recocgni=e the value of esFert evidence. Two
points are fairly obvious. First, the same

of the case. Thus, if the defense expert is
performing her function properly, she will
testify only to suggestive influences that the
jury could reasonably conclude, on the
basis of all the circumstances, were present
in the case. For example, if there is no
basis for concluding that the child was
threatened with negative consequences for
surveys reveal that a substantial number of
failure to describe abuse, then research on
jurors probably do not recoLgnizethis
the effects of such threats would be
suggestibility differential. Second,
irrelevant to the case and should not be
recognizing that children are suggestible, or included in the expert's testimony. If the
more suggestible than adults, says little
defense expert does not exercise selfabout magnitude - how suggestible they
restraint, the court can ensure that her
are. Perhaps more fundamentally, our full
testimony does not stray beyond the case
article shows that the suggestibility of
at hand.
children is not a one-dimensional matter
And, of course, the prosecution is not
that can be summarized adequately by
toothless. The prosecutor may crosssaying that children are [pick your
examine the defense e-pert. In doing so,
adjective] suggestible. How plausibly a
the prosecutor should attempt to expose
gven child might have alleged abuse even
any over-generalizations that the expert has
if the abuse did not occur depends on the
made or any dubious assumptions on
particular situation, including the extent
which the materiality of her evidence
and nature of the suggestive influences to
depends. Moreover, as stated previously, if
which the child was subjected. There is no
the defense impeaches the child's
reason to assume that the average potential
testimony, whether by exlpert testimony or
juror, much less the overwhelming
otherwise, the court should allow the
majority of jurors, has a good
prosecution to present its own expert
understanding of all the insights that
testimony supporting the child's credibility.
decades of psychologcal research have
Likewise, this testimony should be limited
ylelded. For example, research shows that
to the issues made material by the setting
repeated questions may have a pronounced
of the case - specifically, to the grounds
effect on a child, and that children
raised explicitly or implicitly by the defense
subjected to suggestive questioning rather
for being skeptical of the child, or to those
frequently make false statements about
that would likely appear plausible to the
physical events that would be of central
jury even absent the defense's contention.
concern to them.
In short, the adversarial system, through
Furthermore, there is little reason to
the use of cross-examination and rebuttal
assume that expert evidence on this subject witnesses, is resilient and can adequately
\ d l be unduly prejudicial. There is no
expose the weaknesses of expert opinions
plausible basis for believing that allowing
offered by either side.
the defense to present expert testimony will
There does not seem to be any
bias the jury in favor of the defendant, in
substantial reason to assume that jurors
the sense of malung the jury impose an
will tend systematically to overvalue
inappropriately high standard of persuasion defense expert evidence significantly but
on the prosecution. The danger to which
undervalue prosecution ezrpert evidence Lyon seems to be pointing is the possibility
and to do so by enough to warrant
that the jury will give excessive weight to
exclusion. Some jurors may be confused by
the e'xpert's testimony of suggestiveness.
the "battle of the experts," of course, and
But there appears to be no sound basis for
some might unthinkingly treat conflicting
concluding that this danger is real - and
expert evidence as a wash, which they can
that the jury will not only overvalue the
safely ignore. But these are always potential
expert's testimony but will do it so much
problems when expert witnesses contest
that the testimony will be substantially
each other, whatever the subject. Such
more prejudicial than probative. Junes
problems do not justify insisting that the
have convicted defendants in many cases
fact-finder make decisions of enormous
in the face of expert testimony on
importance on the basis of intuition.
suggestibility presented by the defense.
uninformed by the insights that decades of
In assessing the danger of overvaluation, scientific research have to offer.
it is important to bear in mind a major
theme stressed both Lyon and by us: the
degree of a child's testimony is extremely
dependent on the particular circumstances
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Videotaping interviews
The issue of videotaping interviews cvith
a child witness has generated much
discussion. Myers has ably summarized
many of the factors for and against
videotaping. On the positive side of the
,
ledger, Myers notes that videotaping gives
an inteniewer incentive to use proper
techniques and preserves a record of such
use. Perhaps because he is writing from the
vantage point of the inteniewer, Myers
does not mention another equally
important argument: if the intendewer does
use suggestive techniques, the videotape
will reveal it. We have emphasized that the
degree to which a child's sugqestibility
accounts for her allegation of abuse
depends very largely on the extent and
nature of the sucggestive influences to
which she has been subjected. If all
inteniews with the child are videotaped, it
will substantially reduce, and in some cases
effectively eliminate, uncertainty on this
score. An inteniewer's notes are an
unsatisfactory alternative; if historical
accuracy is the goal, there is no substitute
for electronically recording inteniews.
Of course, informal communications
with the child, such as by her parents or
teachers, will not ordinarily be videotaped.
These informal communications are often
significant sources of suggestion. Similarly,
though it might be feasible for a therapist
to tape sessions with a child if there is
suspicion of abuse, taping therapy sessions
as a matter of course would probably be
inappropriate. Moreover, even if therapy
sessions could be appropriately recorded,
the patient-psychotherapist relationship is
privileged, which would probably preclude
evidentiary use of the tape. Thus, in many
cases, a practice of videotaping
investigative interviews does not expose all
serious possibilities of suggestiveness. But
the intractability of some aspects of the
problem is a weak argument against
mitigating the problem where that is
possible. Videotaping considerably narrows
the problem of determining the extent of
suggestive influences to which the child is
subjected, and that is a great benefit.
The arguments on the other side of the
ledger are, once again, based in large part
on the fear that the jury will overvalue the
evidence in favor of the defense. And once
again, we believe that keeping potentially
useful information away from the jury is an
inappropriate means of ensuring that the
jurors will not place too much weight on it.
The prosecution has ample opportunity,
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evidence and arguments minimizing the
importance of the excerpts used by the
other side. The court has authority to
restrain the parties if the p r o m consumes
too much trial time in relation to the
probative value of the evidence.
Thus, in accord with most professionals
in this field, we believe that it is good
practice for official interviewexs to
videotape interviews conducted with
cMdren during an investigation or
prosecution of suspected child abuse.
~oreover,we belike that, absent exigent
circumstances, interviewers should be
required as a matter of law to tape such
interviews. This is the standard practice in
many jurisdictions, and there is no reason
why it should not be made mandatory
In jurisdictions where taping is not
required as a matter of law, courts may
nevertheless craft evidentiary rules based
on a "best evidence" principle that give
interviewers strong incentives to follow the
practice. The most stringent of these rules
would exclude the child's statements, or
even her testimony, if the interviews were
not taped (again, and throughout this
discussion, absent exigent circumstances).
ThLsale, although harsh on its face,
would quickly amount in effect merely to
an almost absolute requirement of taping.
Officials would quickly learn that it is
easier to tape than to invite exclusion of
evidence, and as a result, very little
evidence would actually be excluded. A
somewhat softer rule, followed by some
courts, makes the fdure to videotape the
interview a significant factor in determining
admissibility of the_ chdd's statements or
testimony Other variations would seek to
impose the costs of failure to videotape the
i n t e ~ e won the prosecution, but without
relying on exclusion. Thus, giym the
failure to record, a defense expert could be
allowed to testifj as to the potential effect
of all suggestive influences to whch the
child may have been subjected. The court
might also instruct the jury that the
'I

interviewer failed to follow proper practice
and that the jury should take the failurn
into account in evaluating the possibility
that the chdd's statement or testimony was
the product of suggestion.

Guidance and control
Finally, we come to the end of a trial.
Judges in criminal cases in federal court,
and in some other jurisdictions, are free to
comment to the jury on the weight of the
evidence, including factors bearing on the
credibility of witnesses. Thus, if a witness is
a drug or alcohol abuser, or a former
accomplice of the defendant, or if she has
received or hopes to receive favorable
treatment in return for her testimony, the
judge may comment on how these factors
affect her credibility Similarly,judges often
comment generally about the factors that
are believed to affect the credibility of
eyewitnesses.
Suppose, then, that a chlld testifies or
makes an admissible out-of-court statement
alleging abuse, and evidence supports the
conclusions that she was previously
subjected to highly suggestive influence
The question arises whether the judge
should comment on these influences as
potentially affecting her credibility In most
Continued on page 108

The question remains wbetber, and
wben, an expert's opinion may assist
tbejury suflciently to wawant
admissibility. Ultimately, tbis question
depends on an assessment oftbe
probative value and prejudice of tbe
expert evidence. Lyon contends tbat

cases. we do not believe that any judicial
comment - either supporting or adverse
to the child$ credibility - is necessary.
ire believe it usually suffices if the court
affords the parties adequate opportunity to
present expert evidence on the likely
impact of these influences. In an egregous
case involving highly sugqestive influences,
some judicial comment might be
appropriate.
Along with the power to comment on
the credibility of witnesses, a trial court
also has the authority in a criminal case to
refuse to enter judLgment on a ierdict of
guilt, and to remit the prosecution to a new
trial, if it is persuaded that the verdict is
contrary to the great weight of the
evidence. In making this determination.
the court is free to consider the credibility
of witnesses. Therefore, an accused might
argue that a child's statement or testimony
is SO tainted by suggestion that a verdict of
guilty cannot stand. We believe that this
argument should usually but not allvays, fail.
Suppose that the case is marked by two
factors. First, apart from the child's
testimony or prior statements, the
prosecution has insubstantial evidence as
to at least one element of the charge,
mostly likely to the fact of abuse. Second,
the child was subjected to highly
s u ~ e s t i v einfluences. As Part I1 of our full
article shows, the first factor means that the
prosecution must rely heady on the child's
allegation. Indeed, the allegation must
c a m the prosecution's case the very large
distance from the presumption of
innocence to the constitutionally mandated
standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. And the court might conclude, on
the basis of the second factor, that the
probability that the child would make the
allegation even though it is false cannot
reasonably be perceived as minuscule.
Putting these two considerations together,
the court might well conclude that a jury
could not reasonably find that the
prosecution satisfied its standard of
persuasion.
If prosecutors select cases appropriately,
cases with both these features will be rare.
The judicial power to reject a verdict, even
if usually kept in resenre, can be a
powerful force ensuring that the
prosecutors do indeed make careful
selections.

Conclusion
Research on the suggestibility
children reveals that the degree to wnicn
children are suggestible depends to a large
extent on how investigators conduct
inteniews. It also indicates that abuse
investigations are often conducted in such
a way as to enhance the dangers of
suggestibility. We have presented a set of
policy recommendations that we belie1.e
are consonant with those findings. These
recommendations are, we believe, ellenhanded, reflecting a bias for neither the
prosecution nor the defense. The proof of
our even-handedness may be that we have
exposed ourselves to a two- flank attack.
Prosecutors may complain about our
recommendations that in some circumstances
children's statements regarding abuse
should be regarded as unreliable for
hearsay purposes, that courts should often
be receptive to expert evidence
emphasizing the suggestibility of children,
that videotaping of inteniews should be
mandatory. and that occasionally the
weakness of a child's statement or
testimony should cause the court to refuse
to enter a judgment of guilt. Defense
lawyers, on the other hand, are likely to
complain about our recommendation that,
in all but egregious cases, the child should
not be rendered incompetent to testify
because she was esposed to strongly
suggestive inteniewing techniques.
We suspect that scholars who have
recently challenged the legal significance of
the psychologcal research emphasizing
children's suggestibility are not motivated
principally by antipathy to policy proposals
such as the ones we have presented. Rather,
we suspect that they are concerned about a
matter of mood. In an earlier day, children's
statements were often not taken seriously As a
result, child sexual abuse was under-reported
and under-prosecuted.Thus, there is a
concern that scientific research emphasizing
that chlldren are suggestible will be taken for
more than it is worth and lead us back to
penlasive and unwarranted devaluation of
children's statements and testimony
We recognize this concern. But we balk
at any approach that makes it more difficult
to recognize, and thus mitigate, problems in
the lvay children allegng abuse are
inteniewed. And we confess that we do have
a bias of an intellectual sort, which underlies
our predilection in favor of allowing both the
child and experts to testify Accurate factfinding, we believe, is not best achieved by
trylng to maintain and regulate the factfinders' ignorance. The best cure for possible
misunderstanding is not to keep an area in
darkness, but rather to bathe it in light.
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